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LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF POLICE:  
LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE                                       
HANDLING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
By 
Professor Mary M. Cheh* 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
 Various mechanisms exist to oversee police behavior.  These include internal discipline, 
civilian review boards, civil lawsuits, and criminal prosecutions.  These are important tools, and 
commentators and police experts have devoted considerable effort to refining and critiquing 
them.1  But another, less examined tool is legislative oversight and, in particular, the legislative 
investigation.  When the legislature steps in, there is both power to act -- through subpoenas and, 
ultimately, legislation -- and the gravitas of the people’s representatives focusing their attention 
on police practices. 
 Legislative investigations are usually associated with Congress, typically in the form of 
                                                 
 * Elycee Zenoff Research Professor of Law, George Washington University.  The author 
served as Special Counsel to the D.C. Committee of the Judiciary.  Many thanks to G.W. law 
student V. David Zvenyach who provided invaluable research assistance and wonderful 
enthusiasm.  All views expressed are the author’s own and are not meant to reflect the views of 
the District of Columbia. 
 
 1 See POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE  
(William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds. 1996) (many articles and an extensive bibliography, 
primarily focused on issues of brutality).  See also ANDREW GOLDSTEIN & COLLEEN LEWIS, 
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICING: GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); 
Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 151 (2003); Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 653 (2004) (analyzing the efficacy of traditional approaches of complaint review as a 
vehicle for systemic reform). 
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public hearings.  But policing is largely a local and decentralized affair, and cities and counties 
have a vital role in exercising oversight of the police.  Most local oversight, to the extent that it is 
exercised, occurs as part of the budgetary process.  A town council, for example, may question 
the amount, purpose, or results of certain expenditures.  On occasion, however, when the issue is 
politically salient and involves police practices that are neither isolated nor sporadic, but 
department-wide and on-going, local legislative bodies may choose to inform themselves with 
their own inquiry. 
 The legislature may therefore choose to review police policies concerning the use of 
surveillance,2 informants and undercover operatives,3 the implementation of community 
policing,4 the use of force,5 eradication of gang activity,6 and, perhaps most prominently in the 
                                                 
 2 See, e.g., Martha T. Moore, Cities opening more video surveillance eyes, USA TODAY, 
July 18, 2005, at 3A (“Civil libertarians complain that although private security video often is 
seen only after a crime has occurred, many public video cameras are watched all the time. In 
Washington, public protest led to restrictions: Cameras are turned on only during large 
demonstrations and emergencies, and that fact is announced at the time.”); Editorial, Watching 
the watchers, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at A20. 
 
 Congress, unlike state legislatures, has passed many laws related to surveillance and 
privacy.  See, e.g., the Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), the Wiretap 
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III (1968), the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 
99-508 (1986), the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414 
(1994). 
 3 Arthur Santana, Ramsey Defends Surveilling Protesters; Chief Says Some Changes 
Needed as Council Members Object to Undercover Tactics, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at B5. 
 4 See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 654 (1997) (“Police 
departments are also at least theoretically accountable to local legislative bodies, since these 
bodies perform an oversight function that some community policing theorists have suggested 
might be enhanced.”). 
 5 Jeremy Meyer, Police oversight plan revised Aurora board would have four from 
community, four from cops, DENVER POST, July 15, 2005, at B5 (discussing the creation of a 
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post 9/11 world, counter-terrorism initiatives.7  All of these matters involve policy decisions at 
the department level and not actions taken at the discretion of individual officers in the field.  
The aim of legislative oversight is not to micro-manage police decisions, but to structure those 
decisions in line with best practices and to maintain constitutional boundaries.  Acting through 
their elected representatives, communities can have a say, for example, in whether shoot to kill 
policies8 should be liberalized or whether, and under what circumstances, random searches may 
be conducted of anyone traveling on a bus or a train,9 or the extent to which the police may 
maintain dossiers on individuals or groups.10  
 This essay identifies the benefits and limits of local legislative investigations as a means 
                                                                                                                                                             
"use-of-force" review board in Denver).  
 6 Yvonne Abraham, More cities weigh crackdown on gangs, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 
2003, at A1. 
 7 See, e.g., John Caher, State Legislature Approves Tough Anti-Terrorism Laws, NEW 
YORK L.J., Sept. 18, 2001, at 1 (reporting the passage of a New York state counter-terrorism 
measures in the wake of 9/11). 
 8 The Capitol Police of Washington, D.C., for example, has a controversial “shoot-to-
kill” policy, which permits officers to shoot suspected suicide bombers.  Compare Sari Horwitz, 
Capitol Police Focused On Terror; Recent Moves Part Of Broader Strategy, WASH. POST, Aug. 
4, 2005, at B1 (“If the suspect appears to be carrying explosives and refuses to stop and be 
searched or to cooperate otherwise, officers are instructed to shoot the suspect in the head.”), 
with Editorial, Shoot to Kill, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2005, at A15 (“The key lesson here is that 
with rigorous training, authorities can learn to identify suicide bombers with greater accuracy, 
and to disarm them in most instances without killing. Shooting to the head may be a necessary 
last resort, but if through rash actions and poor judgment innocent people end up as the victims, 
the main battle has already been lost.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York starts to inspect bags on the 
subways, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1.  Notably, the use of random searches on subways in 
New York has not only caused controversy, it has led to litigation.  Michelle Garcia, New York 
Police sued over subway searches, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2005, at A3. 
 10 See, e.g., OR. REV. ST. § 181.575 (2003) (Oregon law limiting the amount and type of 
information that law enforcement agencies may collect). 
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of police oversight by looking at the 2003 investigation of the Metropolitan Police Department 
by the Judiciary Committee of the City Council of the District of Columbia.11  The investigation 
focused on how the police handled (or mishandled) anti-globalization demonstrations held in 
Washington, D.C. from 2000-2003, and how that inquiry led, ultimately, to the drafting of model 
legislation, “The First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004,” which became law 
in 2005.12 The experience shows that legislatures need not be bystanders to police misbehavior 
or excess and that, indeed, the people’s representatives may be in the best position to judge the 
wisdom of police policies and practices and, where appropriate, provide reform.13 
Background 
 As the Nation’s capital, Washington D.C. has served as the major United States site for 
hundreds of protests, demonstrations, rallies, and marches.14  Between the years 2000 and 2003, 
                                                 
 11 D.C. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF THE 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT’S POLICY AND PRACTICE IN HANDLING DEMONSTRATIONS 
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (“DC Report”) (2004), available at  
http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/patterson/pages/prinfo/MPDreport31104.doc (last 
visited 8/21/05). 
 12 The First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 2296 
(Mar. 11, 2005) (hereinafter “FARPSA” or “the Act”). 
 13 Indeed, while courts are often seen as the vehicle for counter-majoritarian protection of 
individual rights from the police, the MPD investigation proves that legislatures are uniquely 
capable of reinforcing individual liberties through democratic means.  For a discussion of the 
relationship between democracy and law enforcement, see David A. Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (discussing theories of democratic pluralism, 
participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy as they apply to various issues in policing). 
 14 See generally LUCY BARBER, MARCHING ON WASHINGTON  (2002) (recounting the 
history of marches and demonstrations in Washington, D.C.).  Capital cities have historically 
served as major sites for symbolic protests, and the response to those protests can reflect the 
values of the nation generally.   Therefore, the Chinese response to the Tiananmen Square 
protests in Beijing reflected the perception of the oppressive communist regime.  In contrast, the 
recent Orange Revolution protests in Independence Square in Kiev, Ukraine, were hailed by the 
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thousands of demonstrators came to the city specifically to protest the effects of globalization, 
the inauguration of George Bush as President, and the war in Iraq.15  Similar protests occurred in 
cities around the nation, with the most notorious occurring in Seattle, Washington during World 
Trade Organization meetings held November 29 to December 3, 1999, and a more recent violent 
encounter during Western Hemisphere free trade talks held in Miami on November 20, 2003.16  
The violence arose from clashes with the police, when overwhelmingly non-violent protestors 
faced official overreaction and police brutality.  
 In Seattle, a small number of demonstrators blocked streets, set fire to trash cans, spray 
painted graffiti, vandalized stores, and caused more than $3 million in damage to downtown 
businesses.17  There were 631 arrests, most of them for obstruction of traffic and failure to 
disperse.18  The cause of this “disastrous week of tear gas, burning dumpsters, and injured 
citizens,”19 was a complicated amalgam of poor planning, a police force of 600 overwhelmed by 
                                                                                                                                                             
West as a symbol of strength and the triumph of democracy. 
 15 See, e.g., Petula Dvorak & Michael E. Ruane, Police, Protesters Claim Victory; 
Scattered Scuffles and Arrests Punctuate a Largely Peaceful Day, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2000, at 
A1(IMF protests); Karlyn Barker & Serge F. Kovaleski, Day Is Filled With Drama And 
Defiance, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at A1 (inauguration protests); Monte Reel & Manny 
Fernandez, 100,000 Rally, March Against War in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at A1. (anti-
war protests). 
 16 See, e.g., David Postman, Jack Broom & Florangela Davila, Police haul hundreds to 
jail – National Guard on Patrol; 1,000 protestors enter restricted zone, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 
1999, at A1 (Seattle protests); Steven Greenhouse, Demonstration Turns Violent at Trade Talks 
in Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at A25 (Miami protests). 
 17 SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, WTO AFTER ACTION REPORT 49 (2000), available at  
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/Police/Publications/WTO/WTO_AAR.PDF. 
 18 Id. at 48. 
 19 SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, WTO ARC PREPARATIONS AND PLANNING PANEL, FINAL 
REPORT 3 (2000), available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/panel2final.pdf. 
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the task of policing a crowd of 50,000, a small number of violent actions by protestors, and 
broad overreaction by the police and government officials.20  The Seattle City Council’s World 
Trade Organization Accountability Review Committee found that: “The WTO Conference 
deteriorated into chaos and violence due to: (1) [p]oor planning and preparation[,] (2) [l]imited 
coordination among Mayor Paul Schell, the Seattle Police Department, and the Seattle Host 
Organization[,] and (3) [a] pattern of leaders at every level abdicating their responsibilities 
throughout the planning process.”21 
                                                 
 20 SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW 
COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT 3 (2000), available at 
http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/arcfinal.pdf 
 21 Id. at 11. 
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 In Miami, eight to ten thousand demonstrators, mostly union members and retirees, were 
met by 2,500 police clad in full riot gear.22  In response to provocations as mild as one protestor 
throwing an orange, police indiscriminately assaulted, pepper sprayed, and shot rubber bullets at 
the otherwise peaceful crowd.23  In some incidents, there was no crowd provocation of any kind. 
The police hit protestors with batons, zapped them with stun guns, and dispersed them with tear 
gas.24  Overall more than 200 people were arrested.25  An independent panel created to review the 
actions of the police “strenuously condemn[ed] and deplore[d] the unrestrained and 
disproportionate use of force observed in Miami,”26 and expressed “heartfelt apologies to the 
visitors who came to our city to peaceably voice their concerns, but who were met with closed 
fists instead of open arms.”27 
 Even in cities that did not experience such dramatic behavior, police and government 
officials have deprived anti-globalization, anti-war, and anti-administration protestors of their 
rights of free expression by more subtle tactics.28  In other situations, protestors have been forced 
                                                 
 22 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 16; John Pacenti, Miami Trade Summit Security 
Hailed, Reviled, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at 1A; Robyn E. Blumner, Miami Crowd 
Control Would Do A Tyrant Proud, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, at 1P. 
 23 Blumner, supra note 22. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FTAA DEMONSTRATION COMPLAINTS INQUIRY1-2 
(2004). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Most recently, police used the tactic of mass arrests during the 2004 Republic National 
Convention in New York City, where over a thousand protestors were arrested.  In subsequent 
lawsuits, some of the protestors have alleged that the arrests were unlawful and baseless, that 
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to demonstrate in out-of-sight locations, or penned behind barricades to keep them from the 
objects of their protest.29  The Secret Service has, for example, used “security zones” to insulate 
President Bush from the sights and sounds of opposition marches and demonstrations.30  Federal 
and state police have used sophisticated and intimidating tactics, such as surveillance, undercover 
operatives, disinformation, and preemptive arrests to undermine and frustrate the ability of 
protestors to conduct their demonstrations and send their message to the larger public.31   
 Since the tumultuous anti-Viet Nam protests of the 1970's, the Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD) of Washington, D.C., (and the related police agencies of the area such as the 
National Park Police) have gained a reputation for peacefully, efficiently, and fairly handling 
mass demonstrations.32  The MPD proved able to protect the public and honor the free speech 
rights of protestors, even hundreds of thousands at a time and even in the presence of counter 
demonstrations.  But most of these free speech events were tame, negotiated, stage-managed 
affairs that, despite their size, were usually controversial only in the debate about how big the 
crowd was.33   
                                                                                                                                                               
protestors were held in unsafe conditions (according to some reports, those arrested were held in a 
former bus garage on a riverfront pier), and were detained for excessive periods of time.  See 
Robert D. McFadden, Vast Anti-Bush Rally Greets Republicans in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2004, at A1; Martha T. Moore, Protesters challenge NYC arrests, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2005, 
at 3A; Diane Cardwell, Lawyers’ Group Sues City Over Arrests of Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2004, at B3. 
 29 See Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection 
Of Special Places, 8 D.C. L. REV. 53, 57-58 (2004). 
 30 Id. at 58-60. 
 31 Id. at 54-61. 
 32 Barber, supra note 14, at 224. 
 33 Id. at 226. There have been, for example, the Million Man March, the Million Mom                   
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 The anti-globalization protests were different.34  They were the kind of “troublesome” 
protests that police seek to dominate lest they get “out of control.”35  The protestors, many of 
whom were students, sometimes used radical rhetoric (“We’ll shut down the City”).  They were 
boisterous, confrontational, occasionally disobedient, and hard to negotiate with because they 
were comprised of many loosely affiliated and decentralized groups.  Some of the groups pre-
announced their plans to engage in civil disobedience, such as blocking traffic or preventing the 
members of the World Bank or International Monetary Fund from holding their meetings.36  And 
the police, as they had in the past with anti-Viet Nam war marchers, took up battle stations.  They 
inflated crowd estimates and exaggerated dangers.37  The police made plans for infiltrating, 
disrupting, and preempting the protestors, and resolved that the nation’s capital would not become 
“another Seattle.”38 
                                                                                                                                                               
March, and the annual Pro Life and Pro Choice abortion demonstrations.  
 34 Id. 
 35 See RALPH TEMPLE, THE POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL: A 
MISCONCEPTION OF MISSION AND A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP 2 (2003) (“. . . problematic 
demonstrations – those in which the sponsors pre-announce civil disobedience, such as traffic 
blocking, or in which some factions are bent on vandalism or disorder – have been another matter.  
It is those demonstrations that challenge D.C. Police Management to honor and protect First 
Amendment rights of speech and assembly while maintaining order.  And that is where the 
leadership of the Metropolitan Police Department has, with rare exception, failed.”) 
 36 Indeed one website, <http://www.a16.org>, which served as a virtual headquarters for 
protest groups, had a number of postings that threatened violence and destruction of property.  
See Jack Kelley, In D.C., police, protesters alike say they're prepared Capital braces for weekend 
demonstrations, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2000, at 4A. 
 37 DC Report, supra note 11, at 48. 
 38 Kelley, supra note 36 (quoting Police Chief Charles Ramsey as saying: “They ain’t 
burning our city like they did Seattle.”); John Kifner, Police Move Against Trade Demonstrators, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A6. 
 10
  Two of these “troublesome” demonstrations took place in 2000 and 2002.  In April 2000 
approximately 10,000 demonstrators came to Washington D.C. for a weekend of protests in 
conjunction with meetings held by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.39  This 
was the first Washington anti-globalization protest since Seattle.  The MPD planned for the event 
months in advance, secured significant funding from the federal government, arranged for police 
assistance from other police departments, asked the courts to be prepared for mass arrests, 
investigated and infiltrated the protesting groups, and mobilized the entire department.40  
Eventually 1,300 persons were arrested.41  
 Not content to deal with unlawful behavior if it occurred, the MPD took various actions to 
disrupt and preempt the demonstrations.  For example, on Saturday, April 15, 2000, the day 
before the largest scheduled demonstration, the MPD and City fire officials entered the anti-
globalization groups’ headquarters, or “convergence center,” on the pretext of a fire inspection.42  
Fire officials issued multiple fire code violation notices and closed down the center, thus seriously 
disrupting the plans of the demonstrators and displacing many out-of-town protestors who were 
staying at the building.43  Officials confiscated property of the demonstrators and sealed the 
building, only letting individuals return two days later -- after the demonstrations had ended.44  
                                                 
 39 Anne E. Kornblut, Thousands in protests against finance groups IMF, World Bank 
press on in D.C., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2000, at A1. 
 40 Kelley, supra note 36.  David Montgomery, Protests End With Voluntary Arrests; 
Police, Demonstrators Say They Met Goals, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2000, at A1. 
 41 Id. 
 42 DC Report, supra note 11, at 28-36. 
 43 Id. at 31. 
 44 Id. at 36. 
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The police chief and his top assistant chief made false public statements that the confiscated 
materials included ingredients to make pepper spray and Molotov cocktails.45   
 MPD also used “trap and detain” tactics to round up demonstrators and preemptively 
arrest them.  As the New York Times reported in one account:  
By late evening . . . about 600 people had been arrested.  They faced charges of parading 
without a permit and possibly obstructing traffic, although the march, under continuous 
police escort, caused little serious disruption on the city streets as the marchers mainly 
stayed on sidewalks.  The group of demonstrators had been marching through downtown 
streets – progressively blocked off by the police during the day – when they found 
themselves blocked, then surrounded by city police officers on a block of 20th Street . . . .  
Although the marchers and their supporters on nearby sidewalks chanted for the police to    
let them go, Police Chief [Charles] Ramsey said later that the crowd had refused police 
orders to disperse.  Reporters who had observed the march had not heard any such order.46 
 
 There were also incidents of police using violence against non-violent demonstrators, 
including baton strikes and pepper spray.47 And persons who were arrested were held for 
prolonged periods without access to food, water, or counsel.48 
 Similar harsh, arbitrary, and preemptive actions marked the Fall 2002 anti-globalization 
demonstrations. That protest drew approximately 2000 people, a number easily overwhelmed by a 
far larger police force.49  The MPD’s internal assessment predicted no more than 4,000 
demonstrators even though, publicly, the Police Chief Charles Ramsey told city leaders that 
                                                 
 45 Id. at 35. 
 46 Kifner, supra note 38. 
 47 See, e.g., John Kifner & David E. Sanger, Financial Leaders Meet As Protests Clog 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at A1. 
 48 See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Groups challenge conduct of police, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 
2000, at 3A. 
 49 Manny Fernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Police Arrest Hundreds in Protests; Anti-
Capitalism Events Cause Few Disruptions, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at A1. 
 12
20,000-30,000 would descend on the City.50  The Chief urged workers to take public 
transportation and expect delays. Citing protestor rhetoric, the Chief said the demonstrators 
planned to “shut down the city.”51  
 The most egregious police action occurred on Friday morning, September 27, 2002.  In 
what appeared to be a series of preemptive maneuvers netting a total of 600 arrestees, police 
funneled hundreds of protestors and many uninvolved bystanders into Pershing Park on 
Pennsylvania Avenue.52  Once they were corralled, police closed up the park and arrested nearly 
400 people who were then escorted to busses which had been standing by for that purpose.53  
There had been no violence, and virtually no disorder54 – just some chanting, drum banging, and 
milling about.  And, as the police later conceded, there was no order to disperse and, more 
importantly, no basis for an order to disperse.55        
 City lawyers did not prosecute any of the persons arrested in Pershing Park.  But the aim 
may never have been prosecution since protestors were held in harsh circumstances for prolonged 
periods, exceeding twenty four hours and, by then, the protest was over.  As Chief Ramsey told 
the Washington Post at the time: “These people that are apprehended are going to miss several 
                                                 
 50 DC Report, supra note 11, at 48. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 52-54. 
 54 Some demonstrators had, prior to coming to the park, broken a window and overturned 
newspaper boxes. There was no basis to think that that person or persons were in the group 
arrested and no police effort to identify them apart from the hundreds of persons who were 
marching peacefully. DC Report, supra note 11, at 56-57. 
 55 Id. at 53-56. 
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protests because they’ll be behind bars.”56  
Why a Legislative Investigation Was Necessary 
 Of the multiple ways to oversee police conduct —  internal review, civilian oversight, and 
law suits — none was realistically available or likely to result in a timely, forward-looking 
response to the police abuse of the anti-globalization demonstrators.  And a timely, forward-
looking response was insistently needed because similar protests continued to recur in the District 
and around the country and because police departments were copying the “successful” tactics 
they saw used elsewhere. 
 Washington D.C., like almost every other police department in the nation, has a system of 
internal review.57  Following the 2000 and 2002 demonstrations, MPD did not initiate any review 
of its actions; this, despite the fact that several officers filed after-action reports questioning the 
legality of the department’s behavior and members of the community publicly complained about 
the treatment they received.58  Indeed the Department’s own general orders required an 
investigation under such circumstances.59  The Department only acted after the City Council 
pressured the Mayor to look into the mass arrests effected at Pershing Park in September 2002.60 
But the reluctantly-conducted internal investigation was plagued by irregularities, including 
                                                 
 56 Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, Police, Protestors In D.C. Prepare For Day Of 
Disruption, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at B1. 
 57 The internal review process of the Metropolitan Police Department is overseen by the 
MPDC Office of Professional Responsibility. 
 58 DC Report, supra note 11, at 44-47. 
 59 Id. at 76. 
 60 Id. 
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changes at the direction of the Police Chief which softened criticism of the MPD.61  In the end, 
the investigation was a whitewash.  The Chief reported to the Mayor that no police official should 
be disciplined for the unlawful arrests at Pershing Park, saying that the officers acted in “good 
faith” and were responding to “quickly evolving events.”62  The Mayor overruled this 
recommendation, and a letter of reprimand was sent to the Assistant Chief who said he gave the 
order to arrest.63 Apart from this minor consequence, no MPD officer or official was formally 
disciplined in any way for any action that occurred at either the 2000 or the 2002 demonstrations. 
 Commentators have routinely questioned the ability of police departments to reliably or 
thoroughly investigate themselves.64  This concern was evident in the case of the MPD’s internal 
investigation of the Pershing Park arrests.  The later legislative investigation found that, “The 
[MPD] investigation and release of the final report were marked by evasions and misstatements 
by senior officials including Chief Ramsey, giving rise to the appearance of an attempt to cover 
                                                 
 61 Id. at 76-80. 
 62 Memorandum from Chief Charles H. Ramsey to Mayor Anthony A. Williams regarding 
Final Decisions on Recommendations Following Review of Actions Taken by Members of the 
Metropolitan Police Department During the Fall 2002 IMF/World Bank Protests 15 (Mar. 13, 
2003) (available online at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02-2010.pdf as part of the public docket 
for Chang v. United States, No. 02-2010, made available on September 12, 2003, by order of 
Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan).  See also Carol D. Leonnig, IMF Arrests Improper, Police Found; 
Ramsey Memo Acknowledges Protesters Weren't Warned, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at B2. 
 63 Leonnig, supra note 62 (“Two sources close to the investigation said that the mayor 
overruled the chief’s March recommendation and that [Police Commander] Newsham was given 
a minor reprimand.  Ramsey and Newsham would not comment yesterday.”). 
 64 See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 453, 537 (2004) (“The universal practice of police organizations of limiting information 
regarding complaints filed and aspects of the investigation exacerbates this problem. It creates an 
appearance of favoritism and undermines citizen perceptions of legitimacy.”). 
 15
up Chief Ramsey’s role in ordering the Pershing Park arrests.”65 
   As for other checks on the police, there were no criminal prosecutions of police for their 
actions during the 2000 or 2002 demonstrations.66  And there was no investigation by the City’s 
Civilian Complaint Review Board.67  There were, however, a number of civil lawsuits seeking 
damages and injunctive relief.68  Three of the lawsuits remain pending.69  It is highly unlikely, 
though, that any of these cases will effect fundamental reform in how the MPD behaves.  These 
                                                 
 65 DC Report, supra note 11, at 78. 
 66 This is not atypical.  In fact, in many cases it seems that failing to file charges is the rule 
rather than the exception.  See Craig Whitlock & David S. Fallis, Police Rarely Charged in 
Federal Probes, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at B1 (showing that between 1991 and 1998, only 
1.5% of civil rights complaints led to filed charges); Kevin Flynn, Public Complaints are played 
down, police data show, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at A1 (“Of the 420 cases his office has 
examined so far, Mr. Green said, the [New York Police] department failed to file charges in 295 
of the cases. In 90 percent of those cases, he said, police officials within the Department 
Advocate’s office rejected the review board's finding without conducting any investigation of 
their own.”). 
 67 The CCRB can dismiss, conciliate, mediate or adjudicate complaints of harassment, use 
of unnecessary or excessive force, use of language or conduct that is insulting, demeaning or 
humiliating, discriminatory treatment, and retaliation. D.C. CODE § 5-1107(a) (2005). Apparently 
no complaints were lodged with the Board. Perhaps one reason is that some officers removed 
their badges during the demonstrations and individual officers could not be identified. More 
fundamentally, however, the actions of the police during the demonstrations were primarily 
actions of the police as units, actions directed from the top and in accord with policy and planning 
developed from the top. 
 68 Alan Beattie, Legal battle looms over protests in Washington, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, 
at 6; Manny Fernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, GWU Students Sue Police Over Mass Arrests; 
Lawsuit Alleges Protest Observers, News Photographers Were Unfairly Detained, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 16, 2002, at B3; Carol D. Leonnig, District Reaches Settlement Over Mass Arrests; Other 
Lawsuits Pending From Protests, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at B1. 
 69 Carol D. Leonnig & Del Quentin Wilber, D.C. Settles With Mass Arrest Victims; 7 
Rounded Up in 2002 IMF Protest to Get $425,000 and an Apology, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at 
A1. 
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cases are hard to bring and damage awards are not often an incentive to adopt reforms.70  
Injunctive relief offers greater potential for change since department-wide policies and practices 
can be altered and the results supervised by a judge with continuing authority.71  Yet whether 
these lawsuits will successfully achieve injunctive relief is unclear, and it might be years before 
the open cases are finally resolved.  The simple fact was that the City Council was the only body 
willing and able to act in a timely and effective manner.  
Benefits of a Legislative Investigation 
 Perhaps the greatest advantage of oversight via a legislative investigation is the ability to 
address police practices at a broader, systemic level.  Internal reviews or citizen review boards 
focus on individual complaints which in turn “tends to make rank and file officers scapegoats for 
police misconduct.”72  Civil lawsuits for damages73 and criminal prosecutions also take a narrow 
look backward with the objective of fixing blame.  And, while civil injunctive relief can offer  
forward looking reform it, like all litigation, is bounded by the issues raised by the parties and the 
confining forms of proof associated with lawsuits.  Legislative bodies can inform themselves 
broadly, rely on experts at will, follow trails wherever they may lead, and disregard strict 
                                                 
 70 See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE 
VIOLENCE, supra note 1. 
 71 See Laurie Levinson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV.1, 25-30 (2001) (identifying the strengths and weaknesses of pattern and practice law suits 
and court supervised consent decrees, but cautioning that, “It is an open question whether these 
consent decrees have been effective in bringing police reform.”). 
 72 Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Department of 
Justice “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 24 (2003). 
 73 Pattern and practice lawsuits are different in that they do look at police reform more 
broadly and importantly bring in monitoring from the outside.  
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courtroom rules of evidence.74  It is particularly appropriate to evaluate the MPD handling of 
mass demonstrations from this broader perspective since, in policing demonstrations, individual 
officers are not acting as agents of discretion on the street.  Rather they are quasi-military units 
responding to a pre-existing plan created at the top and administered from the top.  Unlike the 
problem of police use of excessive force, police action during demonstrations cannot plausibly be 
excused as the behavior of a few “bad apples.”75 
 Another advantage of the legislative investigation is greater police co-operation.  Since the 
focus of a legislative investigation is not to affix blame per se, there is a greater likelihood that 
officers will use back channels to inform the committee of what they know or to testify about 
behavior they found questionable.  Of course, the operative words here are “more likely.”  Even 
in a legislative investigation, individual officers may dissemble or cover for higher-ups.  The 
MPD investigation encountered witnesses who exhibited stunning failures to recall or implausible 
claims of non-involvement.   
 The format of a legislative investigation also enhances the prospect of co-operation.  
Testimony can be taken in non-public, executive session.76  The witness can provide narrative 
answers, opinions, and hearsay, and is not subject to cross examination. In short, a witness can 
tell his or her story freely and fully.  A more general form of co-operation may also arise as the 
                                                 
 74 See Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to 
Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. LAW REV. 333, 341 (2002) (suggests that the benefits of 
legislative investigation are legislature’s ability to look at a matter comprehensively, to call upon 
experts, to translate efforts into reforms, and to respond to local realities). 
 75See Armacost, supra note 64, at 457-59 (discussing this persistent police explanation for 
bad behavior).   
 76 D.C. COUNCIL R. 306.  This procedure, although used only once previously in the 
District of Columbia, proved useful during the testimony of several witnesses.   
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entire process of an investigation including a final report, recommendations, and proposed 
legislation generates a salutary dialectic among the legislature, the executive, and the police 
department.  This, of itself, can lead to the department recognizing the need for and voluntarily 
adopting reforms.77 
 A legislative investigation can also move forward with relative speed.  Unlike litigation 
which can drag on for years, an investigation can be completed in months, and legislation can 
follow soon after.  The Judiciary Committee of the D.C. City Council began its legislative 
investigation partly out of frustration with the agonizingly slow pace of the litigation spawned by 
MPD’s handling of the 2000-2003 demonstrations.  For example, cases arising out of the Fall 
2000 demonstration are still only in a pre-trial stage, and no trial date has yet been set, five years 
after the event.  In contrast, the Committee authorized an investigation by a resolution adopted on 
April 28, 2003.  Over the next eight months the Committee collected and studied case law, 
documents, videos, police manuals, and responses to subpoenas and written interrogatories, and  
conducted depositions.  This effort culminated in public hearings held on December 17 and 18, 
2003, and the Committee issued a final report on March 24, 2004.  By the end of 2004, the 
Committee drafted and reported out a comprehensive bill, “First Amendment Rights and Police 
Standards Act of 2004.”78  This model legislation declares protection of First Amendment rights 
to be the public policy of the District of Columbia, sets “rules of engagement” to be followed by 
the police in dispersing, arresting, or holding demonstrators, specifies the circumstances 
                                                 
 77 Indeed, as a result of the DC legislative investigation, the police modified their Standard 
Operating Procedures in 2004 to limit the scope of allowable police intelligence gathering 
activities directed at protest groups.  Infra note 111. 
 78 Supra note 12. 
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permitting investigation of protest groups, and provides for officer training and supervision.  The 
bill became law in 2005.79  
 Legislative investigations, if legitimately and seriously pursued, also have some potential 
to counter the “dual messages” phenomenon that allows police to acknowledge the rules that limit 
their behavior but to flout them at the same time.  Formal policies and official pronouncements of 
police departments never prescribe or approve of violation of rights of free expression any more 
than they prescribe or authorize brutality, corruption, or unlawful conduct.  But informal 
messages and signals may communicate a different set of norms.  When police are told 
exaggerated tales of having to defend their community against violent, Molotov-cocktail throwing 
hordes, when they are complimented for their behavior following demonstrations involving police 
abuse or illegal arrests, when personnel actions (citations, promotions, and the like)80 reward 
aggressive or preemptive conduct, and when the media applaud the police for their fine work in 
quelling or neutralizing peaceful demonstrators, the police notice the disconnect and tend to 
conform their conduct to the informal understandings, or what they view as the “real” rules.81 
                                                 
 79 The bill, 15-968, was enacted on January 27, 2005, as 15-757, and had an effective date 
of April 13, 2005. 
 80 Consider this: On the very same day that the AFL-CIO was calling for the resignation of 
Miami police chief John Timoney for the violent attack on demonstrators in 2003, Union wants 
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Police posts shuffled after 4 Leave; 2 Assistant Chiefs among retiring Commanders, WASH. POST, 
July 29, 2004, at T3. 
 81See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 64, at 515-521(discussing the phenomenon of the 
“double message” primarily in the context of police brutality); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-
ORIENTED POLICING 163 (1990) (“Police agencies have long been notorious for urging rank-and-
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 During the April 2000 and Fall 2002 Washington D.C. demonstrations, top police 
officials, including the Chief of Police, conveyed the message to the rank and file that it was an 
“us against them” situation.82  Top officials grossly inflated the number of protestors planning to 
come to the capital and implicitly or explicitly approved or condoned aggressive police behavior, 
mass arrests, use of batons, pepper spray, pre-emptive trap and arrest maneuvers, mass arrests, 
and harsh and prolonged post-arrest detentions.83  When the Mayor publicly expressed confidence 
in the Chief’s ability to investigate the complaints arising out of the 2000 demonstration, the 
Chief responded: “Unless there is overwhelming evidence that an officer physically abused 
someone, I intend to give them all medals, not discipline, because they did a good job.”84  And, 
when speaking of the unlawful mass arrests during the Fall 2002 demonstration, the Chief 
expressed satisfaction with that action, consistently defended all of the tactics used, and refused to 
acknowledge his own role in the events until the legislative investigation pinned him down.85  
  The Mayor and media lauded the actions of the police.  The leading paper in the City, the 
Washington Post, praised the Department after the 2000 demonstrations with an editorial entitled, 
“Hail To The Chief – And His Cops.”86  A Post news article, entitled “Taken For a Ride, Police 
                                                                                                                                                               
file officers to do one thing while rewarding them for doing something else.”).  
 82 See, e.g., supra note 38. 
 83 See DC Report, supra note 11, Executive Summary; Kelley, supra note 36. 
 84 Kathryn Sinzinger, Patterson, Graham Seek MPD Inquiry, COMMON DENOMINATOR 
(Washington D.C. alternative newspaper), Apr. 24, 2000, at 1. 
 85 DC Report, supra note 11, at 78. 
 86  Editorial, Hail to the Chief – And his Cops, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2000, at A26 (“[The 
protest organizers] gave themselves an ‘A-plus’ for PR when in fact they created a weak 
impression and mainly managed to step on their own fuzzy message by their dubious choice of 
tactics. If any groups deserve high marks, they are the disciplined men and women of the 
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Turn Bike Strike Into A Tour De Force,” described the MPD’s 2002 unlawful funneling, trapping, 
and arresting of seventy-five demonstrating bike riders as an amusing trick played on the 
protestors.87  The article stated in part:  
[Y]ou could tell that the D.C. police bikers thought this whole scene was a hoot. They 
straddled their two-wheelers across the street, watching, smiling sometimes. They could 
afford to be patient. The route may have been ‘secret,’ [referring to the protestors attempt 
to keep their destination quiet] but the police had a pretty good idea of how this adventure 
was going to end anyway. Everyone else was in for a surprise [i.e., arrest].88 
 
But, a legislative investigation can express a counter message and show that there are 
consequences if departmental rules and constitutional rights are violated.  
 Finally a legislative investigation offers advantages even over its close cousin, the “blue 
ribbon” or special commission.89  A blue ribbon commission is ordinarily created by the 
executive branch, and is composed of a panel of experts, who investigate perceived problems and 
report recommendations.90  Over the past thirty to forty years, there has been a proliferation of 
commissions created to study and document police misconduct.  The commissions have produced 
comprehensive reports chronicling beatings, violations of civil rights, patterns of bribe taking, and 
other wrongful conduct in the nation’s police forces, and they have offered wide-ranging and 
                                                                                                                                                               
Metropolitan Police Department and other law enforcement agencies who served under D.C. 
Chief Charles Ramsey.”). 
 87  David Montgomery, Taken for A Ride; Police Turn the Bike Strike Into a Tour de 
Force, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at C1. 
 88 Id. 
 89 The use of a commission can be an especially important alternative to an investigative 
process in certain cases because commissions are non-political bodies.  Whereas legislatures are 
subject to constant political scrutiny, commissions are removed from such pressures.  Thus, in 
circumstances where political pressures could derail an investigation, commissions can still 
provide valuable oversight. 
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thoughtful recommendations for reform.  Some of the more prominent commissions include the 
1967 President's Crime Commission, which was designed to combat organized crime,91 the 1992 
Christopher Commission, which investigated the use of excessive force by the Los Angeles Police 
department in the wake of the Rodney King beating,92 and the 1994 Mollen Commission, which 
studied police corruption in New York.93 
 Like legislative investigations, commission inquiries have the ability to assess police 
behavior at a broader level.  They have the capacity, even without subpoena power, to act in a 
timely fashion.  They can identify systemic issues, provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the 
problem, and offer blueprints for reform.94  But commissions lack the teeth to effectuate 
reforms.95  While Commission recommendations have sometimes been implemented, and while 
Commission reports “have been helpful in understanding the causes of police abuses, they have 
been disappointing in leading to changes in actual department practices.”96  With a legislative 
investigation, the lawmakers themselves are calling for reform, they are directly invested in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
 90 Walker, supra note 72, at 20. 
 91 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). 
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effort, and they possess the levers to implement change.  Even in such circumstances, of course, 
there is no assurance that true reform will result or take hold.  But the odds are better.97      
The Keys to a Successful Legislative Investigation 
 There must be political will to launch an investigation into police practices, and there must 
be a problem of sufficient gravity to warrant the expenditure of time and resources.  But if an 
investigation is to begin, a great deal of planning and preparation must precede it.  The immediate 
challenge in the MPD investigation was to confine the scope of the inquiry to manageable size. 
The relevant period covered three years of activity and multiple incidents.  The solution was to 
focus on several particular events and use them as case studies.  Unless trimmed in this way, the 
investigation could have easily become a meandering slog through mounds of information, thus 
losing momentum and the hope of a timely report.   
 Next began the arduous task of deciding what documentary information to seek, in what 
order, and from whom.  This required an understanding of how the MPD operated, what sorts of 
documents would be generated in connection with policing a demonstration, and who the actors 
were.  The Committee could not have prepared as effectively as it did without having persons 
inside and outside of the MPD who were thoroughly familiar with its operations and willing to 
educate the Committee.  This is a critical component of a successful investigation that seeks to 
                                                 
 97 Of course legislative investigations are not a panacea. Commentators, speaking 
principally about Congressional investigations, have cited various limitations. Partisanship and 
policy differences can destroy the effectiveness of the investigating body, investigating 
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(e.g., the McCarthy hearings). See, e.g., Morris S. Ogul, Congressional Oversight: Structures and 
Incentives, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 317 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 
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uncover not just what happened at certain events but the actual practices and behavior within the 
police department.    
  There were many sessions devoted to preparing subpoenas and others devoted to 
enforcing them.  At many points along the way, the chair of the Judiciary committee, 
Councilwoman Kathy Patterson, had to negotiate, insist, threaten court action, and cajole 
executive branch officials to respond and respond fully and promptly.  A successful investigation 
needs a political leader willing to fight for information and to be persistent.  If not, the effort will 
founder on delay and noncompliance.  But, as the Committee found, even if you have full 
commitment, you still may not get everything you need or ask for.  But subpoena power is a 
mighty force, and a credible threat to use court enforcement or public disclosure can move even 
recalcitrant police departments to co-operate. 
 Once documentary subpoenas and written depositions were served and substantially 
complied with, the Committee turned its attention to the handling of witnesses.  It settled on a 
little used procedure, namely questioning witnesses in executive session.98  These were under 
oath, non-public sessions that gave the Committee and the witness a private setting, free of 
distraction and free of any distorting influence of media attention.  The non-public questioning 
also served to protect the identity of undercover officers, provide some shield  for officers who 
were concerned about departmental retribution for their testimony, and limit the ability of officers 
to collaborate on or conform their testimony. 
 The rules governing these executive sessions were the same as those applicable in a public 
hearing and gave the Committee considerable latitude to develop the facts and secure a witness’s 
                                                 
 98 See supra note 76. 
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co-operation.  After being sworn in, witnesses were advised of their rights to claim the Fifth 
Amendment (none did), to invoke any common law privileges, such as spousal privilege (none 
did), to be assisted by counsel (almost all were), and to make an opening statement (almost none 
did).  Witnesses were also told that they would be protected against retaliation for their testimony 
by the District of Columbia’s Whistleblower’s Protection Act.99 
 Operating almost like a grand jury or an investigating magistrate, the executive session 
questioning was done by Committee counsel.  The witness was told that the proceeding was not 
like a trial, that it was not an adversary proceeding, that hearsay was acceptable, and that full and 
complete answers could include the witness’s opinion.  The witness and the witness’s lawyer 
were advised that only objections based on privilege were permissible, all rulings would be made 
by the Committee counsel, and the witness’s lawyer had no right to pose questions or cross 
examine.  
 The proceeding often had the feel of a deposition as witnesses were led through a series of 
questions.  But it was also like a conversation.  The questioning took place in a small conference 
room, with few persons present, usually three persons from the Committee, the witness and the 
witness’ lawyer.  It was audio taped.  On occasion a witness’s lawyer would complain that a 
question was unclear or interject in some other way to interrupt or stop the witness from 
answering.  But, like any other legislative hearing, the lawyer’s role was confined to advising the 
witness if assistance was sought or to protecting any privileges the witness may have had.  For the 
most part, the Committee was successful in preventing lawyer interference, and that, combined 
with the non-adversary and non-threatening environment, often produced valuable information. 
                                                 
 99 Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Contractors and Instrumentalities of the 
District Government, DC CODE §§ 1-615.51 - 1.615.59 (2001). 
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 The Committee followed a fairly conventional approach to the calling of witnesses, 
namely working from the bottom up.  Out of respect, the Committee did not call the Chief of 
Police to testify in executive session.  His testimony came in the form of responses to 
interrogatories, and he also gave live testimony at a two-day public hearing. By then the 
Committee pretty much had all of the relevant facts in hand. 
    The public hearings also served a separate, valuable function.  They highlighted the 
issues and drew media attention.  They allowed members of the public, interested groups, and 
aggrieved citizens to participate directly.  They were also a further means of countering the “dual 
message” phenomenon as everyone could see police officials facing criticism, not approval, for 
violating their formal rules and standards. 
Results 
 The Committee issued its investigative Report on March 24, 2004.  Overall the Committee 
found that, in policing the anti-globalization demonstrations, the MPD had failed “to 
acknowledge and protect the rights of individuals to privacy, and to free speech and assembly,”100 
and repeatedly violated the Department’s own guidelines for handling demonstrations “including 
guidelines on use of force in defensive situations, de-escalation in crowd control, and predicates 
required for mass arrests.”101  The 156-page submission provided background, specific findings, 
and recommendations.  The Report detailed not only MPD conduct during the demonstrations but 
also revealed MPD’s “use of undercover officers to infiltrate political organizations in the 
absence of criminal activity and in the absence of policy guidance meant to protect the 
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constitutional rights of those individuals being monitored.”102  The Report also exposed 
disturbing practices within the Department, practices that are not necessarily ferreted out in 
lawsuits, such as a pattern and practice of evasion on the part of leaders of the MPD as to their 
actions and the failure of the MPD to police its own members for misconduct associated with 
demonstrations.103 
 Importantly the Report placed the MPD’s behavior within the history of protest in the 
District of Columbia, and set it within the larger context of how police departments around the 
country are currently reacting to protests and demonstrations.104  The Report observed, for 
example, that: 
Through legislation and litigation U.S. police entities, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, are blurring the distinction between intelligence and law enforcement as an 
outgrowth of the war on terrorism.  This important and wide-ranging development 
includes questioning the continuing validity of the requirement, heretofore, that criminal 
activity or the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must precede police use of certain 
types of investigation.  Earlier prohibitions on creation of dossiers on individuals based on 
their political activities have been weakened in the name of an expanding definition of 
“law enforcement.”  Some police departments apparently are following the lead of the FBI 
in using “disruption” techniques, borrowed from intelligence practices overseas and 
applied locally to prevent or minimize protest activity.  Some local jurisdictions, as well 
as the Secret Service, have used buffer or “no protest” zones at public events as a security 
tool, a practice that has been challenged for having a chilling effect on civil liberties.105 
 
 The Committee reported on protests in San Francisco, Seattle, and Miami, and protests at 
the 2000 Democratic and Republican conventions,106 and the phenomena was repeated again in 
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2004.107  By linking these events, the Report  provided the opportunity to consider how the 
practices of one police department are often mimicked by others and to consider the cumulative 
impact of such actions. 
 The media reported on the Committee’s work at the various stages of investigation, public 
hearing, and findings and recommendations.  As a result, there appeared to be a different  
perception of the MPD’s actions, as was illustrated by an editorial in the Washington Post on 
December 17, 2003, which stated, in part:  
The committee’s probe, which concentrates on the department’s handling of 
demonstrations in the nation’s capital, should be followed closely by residents and visitors 
alike . . . . During the two-day hearing, District residents are likely to gain a sense of how 
far their department has fallen from the period in the 1970's and 80's when the District’s 
police were nationally renowned for their ability to handle large demonstrations while 
remaining on the proper side of the Constitution.108   
 
 Gone was “Hail to the Chief and his Cops.”109 
     The Committee furnished a copy of its Report to the Mayor who had agreed to have the 
Deputy Mayor, the police chief, and the City’s lawyers prepare a response to each 
recommendation it contained.  That Response agreed in whole or part with many of the 
recommendations but disagreed with many others.110  For example, in answer to the Committee’s 
concerns that no guidelines existed to regulate undercover investigations of protest groups, the 
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Response identified a new SOP (standard operating procedure) the MPD had just adopted to 
remedy the problem.111  On the other hand, the Response disagreed with the recommendation that 
“MPD should be prohibited from using undercover officers to conduct surveillance of individuals 
or organizations based solely on the content of their political speech or ideology.”112  Overall the 
Response showed that fundamental differences remained, but it was clear that the Committee’s 
work had already provoked reform, and to that extent, had already served its dialectical function. 
 And the ultimate result of the investigation was a model statute which declares that 
protestors are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment and, specifically, that 
demonstrators have the right to be near the object of their protest so that they may be seen and 
heard. The new law establishes rules governing how the police train for,113 investigate,114 and 
manage protests and demonstrations,115 as well as how they handle unpermitted 
demonstrations,116 crowd dispersal,117 and protestor arrests and detentions.118  For example, 
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because the police practice of dispersing and arresting protestors for lack of a permit or the rowdy 
behavior of a few repeatedly created the predicate for arbitrary action or preemptive arrests, the 
new law prohibits arresting protestors solely because they lack a permit to demonstrate.119  
Moreover, if there are reasons to arrest persons within a demonstration, the law provides that 
those persons and not the entire gathering are subject to arrest. And, should grounds exist for 
dispersing an entire crowd— grounds limited to a significant number of participants violating 
time, place, and manner restrictions where reasonable measures to insure compliance have been 
tried and are unavailing, a significant number of participants engaging in unlawful disorderly 
conduct or violence, or a public safety emergency—proper and adequate notice must be given. 
The essence of these provisions is to limit police to proportionate, graduated, and precise actions.   
 The First Amendment and Police Standards Act also establishes the practices to be 
followed in effecting arrests and holding persons arrested in connection with a protest or 
demonstration.120  The investigation found that it was an MPD practice and a practice of other 
departments around the country  to hold arrestees for long periods under uncomfortable or painful 
circumstances.121  It appeared that such tactics were designed to keep protestors from rejoining 
the protests and to punish them for their activities. Neither purpose is permissible, but it is fairly 
easy to disguise these objectives by citing administrative problems, such as, “the computers 
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crashed,” or “we just didn’t have enough personnel at the intake site.” The legislation sets out 
specific protocols to counter these tendencies. 
 Of course, legislative solutions have limits. First, one might question why legislation is 
necessary at all given that rights of free expression are already protected by the constitution. It is 
true that the Constitution does protect freedom of expression and other rights such as the right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  But it is also true that the Constitution does not 
fully protect us against all substantial invasions of fundamental liberties. As academics are fond 
of noting, the Constitution is a floor, not a ceiling of protection.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
captured this reality when he joined with a majority of the Supreme Court in holding that it was 
perfectly constitutional to forfeit a wife’s interest in the family car even though she was 
completely innocent of her husband’s illegal use of the car.122  He said that the outcome was 
“ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely 
undesirable.”123  Legislation can be the antidote, by creating rights or extending or elaborating on 
existing constitutional protections. That is why we have civil rights statutes, privacy acts, and 
laws limiting otherwise lawful police actions such as surveillance.  
 Even where the Constitution does protect individual rights, legislation can give more 
detailed content and structure to those rights. This is the case, for instance, with the Speedy Trial 
Act124 which specifies and fleshes out the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that, 
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“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy a speedy . . . trial,”125 or the federal 
wiretapping statute126 which amplifies Fourth Amendment rights as they relate telephone taps.127  
And even statutory provisions that simply mirror constitutional guarantees have an important role 
in protecting liberty and individual dignity.  They affirm legislative commitment to fundamental 
principles and renew public awareness.  They have, in other words, an expressive function.128  
This can be particularly effective in countering the “dual messages” phenomenon that allows 
police to acknowledge the rules that limit their behavior but to ignore them all the same.129  
 Another shortcoming of legislative solutions is that some aspects of policing do not lend 
themselves to rules.  Sometimes the best that can be done is to set standards.130  The Committee 
recognized the difficult task of legislating in a way that preserved needed police discretion but 
also reined in excess.  The new legislation begins with a broad statement of policy acknowledging 
                                                 
 125 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 126 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 
(2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 127 Id. 
 128 There is a significant amount of literature dedicated to the discussion of expressive 
functions of law.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and 
the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 767-74 (1998); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical 
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2027- 28 (1996). 
 129 See supra text surrounding notes 80-88. 
 130 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 22 (1992) (assessing the value of standards and rules in different contexts).  See also 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
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the fundamental rights of free expression.131  Then, when dealing with matters which require 
discretion, such as when to use certain investigative techniques like infiltration, the legislation 
uses procedural devices such as requiring approval from a higher ranking officer,132 limiting the 
duration of approvals,133 and documenting the uses of the technique.134  These sorts of procedural 
devices are a common means of structuring an officers’ thinking, making sure proper 
justifications can be expressed, and getting the sober benefits of oversight. 
 Finally, even where legislative rules make sense, simply adopting more rules will mean 
little if the rules are ignored.  The Committee found that many of the police actions during the 
2000 and 2002 demonstrations were already prohibited by internal orders and policies.135  
Embodying rules in legislation may give them more heft, but the police themselves must commit 
to following the rules.  One glaring disappointment of the D.C . legislative investigation was the 
unwillingness of top police department officials to acknowledge mistakes.  That stance could be 
partly explained by concern over pending lawsuits.  But the instinct never to admit fault appears 
                                                 
 131 FARPSA § 103 (“It is the declared public policy of the District of Columbia that 
persons and groups have a right to organize and participate in peaceful First Amendment 
assemblies on the streets, sidewalks, and other public ways, and in the parks of the District of 
Columbia, and to engage in First Amendment assembly near the object of their protest so they 
may be seen and heard, subject to reasonable restrictions designed to protect public safety, 
persons, and property, and to accommodate the interest of persons not participating in the 
assemblies to use the streets, sidewalks, and other public ways to travel to their intended 
destinations, and use the parks for recreational purposes.”). 
 132 Id. at §§ 205(b), 206(b), 207(d). 
 133 Id. at §§ 205(d), 206(d).  
 134 Id. at §§ 211, 212. 
 135 See supra note 96. 
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to be deeply ingrained.136  Indeed when looking at all of the Police Chief’s public comments and 
testimony, it is evident that he was and remains pleased with his handling of the demonstrators.  
But legislation or no legislation, it is probably the case that the public exposure of the legislative 
investigation was sufficiently negative that even troublesome demonstrations will be handled 
differently in the future.  For good measure, the new law includes a requirement that police 
officers receive training in how to handle demonstrations137 and, specifically, that they actually 
read and receive instruction on the provisions of the law and all regulations adopted under it.138  
 Conclusion 
 Local legislatures are not known for active oversight of police or security agencies.  The 
general posture appears to one of deference to executive or police officials and a reliance on 
courts and police boards to correct mistakes.  There are probably many reasons for this hands-off 
posture.  Legislators may feel that they lack the needed expertise, or they fear their involvement 
                                                 
 136 This instinct, might in fact, come with the territory of being a law enforcement officer.  
As one commentator has pointed out, “Socialization into law enforcement occurs over many 
months of training. During this period, recruits don a transitional uniform and persona. They learn 
rules, procedures, law, communication skills, first aid, weaponry, fitness, self-defense, pursuit 
driving, ethics, and pride. They experience belonging. They are purposefully convinced they are 
elite. And somewhere along the way, they adopt a ‘warrior-of-the-street’ mentality. When the 
police uniform is finally put on, it is truly a suit of armor, a persona serving both individual and 
collective needs.  ‘Image armor’ allows the officer to ‘always look in control, to always be the 
authority, to repress emotions, to never admit mistakes, to ‘take charge,’ and, consequently, to 
repress true emotions.’” Sally Gross-Farina, Fit for duty? Cops Choirpractice, and another 
chance for healing, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1079, 1106-1107 (1993). 
 137 FARPSA § 115. 
 138 Id.  Another way to enforce the statute is to provide citizens with a private cause of 
action.  A provision to this effect was originally included as part of the proposed legislation, and 
witnesses before the committee (for example, ACLU representatives) supported this strategy.  
However, the provision was not ultimately adopted, primarily due to opposition by the Police 
Department. 
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may be viewed as interference with police discretion and the ability to fight crime, or they may 
balk at confronting a specialized bureaucracy that tends to be insular, close-mouthed, and 
hierarchal.  It was especially remarkable that the District of Columbia City Council pursued its 
investigation of how the MPD handled anti-globalization demonstrations because it is not often 
that champions of free speech arise from the legislative ranks.  Legislatures tend, as appropriate, 
to cater to majority wishes.  And, while majorities are committed to free speech and assembly in 
the abstract, experience teaches us that, when it comes to protests and demonstrations, the 
majority seems to want no fuss, and, especially, no traffic tie-ups.  If the police have to use some 
strong arm measures and indiscriminate arrests to insure convenience, there is not always a public 
hue and cry. 
 But Washington D.C. is a liberal city with strong civil rights and civil liberties 
sensibilities.  The police misbehavior was dramatic and embarrassing, and it appeared that the 
harsh and unlawful treatment of protestors was planned and unnecessary.  It also appeared that 
there would be little accountability or correction if the legislature didn’t step in.  Having stepped 
in, the investigation by the District, and the report and legislation that resulted from it, illustrated 
how beneficial such oversight can be.  It exposed bad practices and shortcomings and restored a 
proper balance between law enforcement and liberty.  The public was informed, persons harmed 
by the police action had a form of public recompense, and the police, too, benefitted in that they 
were given clearer rules and a reasonable structure to guide future decision-making.  Overall the 
effort was a remarkable affirmation that good police practices and freedom of expression are not 
antithetical.  
 Given the persistence and seeming intractability of police misconduct, we are entitled to 
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be skeptical of all models to control it.  The simple truth is that no one approach is sufficient, and 
all have advantages and disadvantages.  Yet, as the District of Columbia example shows, 
legislative investigations and oversight can have dramatic and salutary effects.  A legislative 
approach is well suited to oversee general police policy or any pre-existing strategy or planning 
directed by the chief and his top officials.  The public, through its representatives, can and should 
be actively involved in setting and overseeing policies concerning such things as anti-terrorism 
plans, public surveillance and monitoring, and infiltration of political groups.  The District of 
Columbia has shown the way.      
